CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUCCESSIVE MUNICIPAL AND
STATE PROSECUTIONS FOUND PERMISSIBLE DESPITE
ASSUMED APPLICATION OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
Although founding its decision upon the present inapplicability
of the double jeopardy clause to the states, the District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana has determined that, even
assuming such an imposition, successive municipal and state
prosecutions remain constitutionally permissible. Based, however, upon an erroneous analogy to the justifications underlying
successive state and federal prosecutions, the court's conclusion
seems uncompelling. Moreover, the court failed to consider the
significant'question of whether such state and municipal prosecutions are consistent with the requirements of due process.
IN many states, municipal ordinances and state statutes purport to
proscribe virtually identical conduct. Upon the commission of an
act violating both provisions, prosecution of the offender may ordinarily be initiated by either the state or local authorities. On occasion, however, the governmental unit not participating in the
initial adjudication may undertake a subsequent prosecution and
impose further punishment for the same misconduct' despite state
constitutional provisions prohibiting double jeopardy.2 Recently,
in Louisiana ex rel. Ladd v. Middlebrooks,3 it was contended that
such successive prosecutions contravened the double jeopardy prohibition of the fifth amendment of the Federal Constitution. Hypothesizing the applicability of this provision to the states, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana rejected
this contention by drawing an erroneous analogy to the standards
applicable to complementary prosecutions by the state and federal
governments.4 Moreover, the court failed to consider the contempoI See, e.g., Bueno v.State, 40 Fla. 160, 23 So. 862 (1898); State v. Clifford, 45 La.
558, 13 So. 281 (1893); State v. Tucker, 137 Wash. 162, 242 P. 363 (1926). See also
Comment, Double Jeopardy Where Both City and State Prosecute the Same Act, 38
WAs. L. Ray. 819 (1963); notes 24-28 infra and accompanying text.
2
All but five states have constitutional provisions which prohibit a second trial
for the same offense. Those states which do not-Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts,
North Carolina, and Vermont-accept such a prohibition as a part of their statutory
or common law. Newman, Double Jeopardy and the Problem of Sucessive Prosecucutions: A Suggested Solution, 34 S. CAL. L. REv. 252, 252-53 nn.2-3 (1961).
$270 F. Supp. 295 (1967).
'See notes 37-49 infra and accompanying text.
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rarily more significant question of whether successive prosecutions are
consistent with the standards of due process mandated by the fourteenth amendment.5
Convicted of theft in violation of a New Orleans city ordinance,
Melvin Ladd was given a ninety-day sentence." Soon thereafter, he
was indicted for the same act of theft by the State of Louisiana under
a state statute.7 Upon the defendant's plea of guilty, a two-year
sentence was imposed.8 While serving the latter sentence and after
exhausting his state court remedies, Ladd applied for a writ of
habeas corpus to the United States district court on the ground that
his prosecution by the state subsequent to his prosecution by the
municipality for the same act of theft violated the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment.
The prohibition of the double jeopardy provision does not
necessarily preclude successive prosecutions by separate governmental authorities. 9 As established in United States v. Lanza,10
prosecution by the federal government under a statute proscribing
conduct for which the defendant was previously tried by a state
tribunal is constitutionally permissible since the fifth amendment
prohibits only multiple federal prosecutions."' A state criminal
proceeding is not regarded as a prosecution by the federal government since the units receive their power from independent sources:
the states' original power to define and punish crime was reserved to
them by the tenth amendment; in contrast, the federal government
1 See notes 60-76 infra and accompanying text.
0
Ladd was convicted of "theft of merchandise valued at $45 from a New Orleans
department store, Maison Blanche, Inc.," in violation of New Orleans, La., Ordinance

828 7MCS. 270 F. Supp. at 295.

Ladd was charged with "theft of a jacket of the value of Forty-Five ($45.00)

Dollars" in violation of LA. Rlv. STAT. § 14:67 (1950). 270 F. Supp. at 295.
8The court in Ladd did not explicitly indicate whether the defendant's sentences
were to be served concurrently or consecutively.

However, the court stated that the

defendant had served the ninety days and "is presently serving two years."

270 F.

Supp. at 295.
0 See generally Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding Con-

stitution, 28 U. Cm. L. Rav. 591 (1961); Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecu-

tions, 32 COLUm. L. Rlv. 1309 (1932).
10260 U.S. 377 (1922). In Lanza the Supreme Court sustained a defendant's
conviction under federal law for manufacturing, possessing, and transporting liquor

although he had already been convicted for the same conduct in Washington. See Note,
2 ORE. L. REv. 124 (1923); Note, 1 TEXAs L. REv. 343 (1923); Note, 9 VA. L. REG.
(n.s.) 53 (1923); Note, 8 VA. L.
1' 260 U.S. at 382.

REG.

(n.s.) 740 (1923).
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derives its authority from specific provisions of the Constitution. 12
The state and federal governments thus constitute independent sovereignties which may exercise concurrent jurisdiction. One "act"
prohibited by both sovereignties constitutes two separate "offenses,"
prosecution of which is not precluded by the double jeopardy
clause. 13
In Abbate v. United States,' the Supreme Court re-examined
and re-affirmed the Lanza rule, emphasizing that federal law enforcement would be hindered if a federal prosecution for a serious federal
offense were to be barred by a state adjudication under a statute imposing a nominal penalty.15 Reiterating that the state and federal
governments constitute independent sovereignties, the Court broadened the Lanza rationale by stressing that each government may
possess a different interest affected by the conduct in question, necessitating two prosecutions for adequate vindication.'
Noting that
successive sanctions could be precluded by application of a doctrine
of preemption prohibiting concurrent state and federal jurisdiction, the Court considered such a procedure inconsistent with the
proper distribution of power under the federal system, in which the
states possess primary responsibility for enacting and enforcing crim17
inal laws.
12
1d. at 381-82. The federal government derived its power to punish an individual
for manufacturing, possessing, and transporting liquor from the eighteenth amendment.
Id. at 379-81.
111Id. at 882. The fifth amendment provides that no person shall "be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy" (emphasis added). In Lanza the
Supreme Court also reasoned that if an individual could secure immunity from a
federal prosecution by submitting himself to prosecution by the state, respect for
federal laws would be undercut and their deterrent effect lessened. 260 U.S. at 885.
This rationale was subsequently given greater emphasis in Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187 (1959). See notes 14-17 infra and accompanying text. It has been contended
that the "separate sovereignties" concept of Lanza is fundamentally incorrect since
the only "sovereign" in the United States is the citizenry and both the state and
federal governments exercise power received from that source. See Gross, Successive
Prosecutions by City and State-The Question of Double Jeopardy, 43 OR. L. REv.
281, 304-07 (1964).
1' 359 U.S. 187 (1959). In Abbate the Court held that a state prosecution for conspiring to destroy certain telephone lines did not bar a subsequent federal prosecution
based upon the same conspiracy. See Note, 11 HAsTGs L.J. 204 (1959); Note, 53
Nw. U.L. Ray. 521 (1958); Note, 13 Sw. L.J. 528 (1959).
Ir 359 U.S. at 195. In Abbate, in fact, the petitioners wished to use their convictions
under Illinois law, which resulted in sentences of only three months, to bar prosecution under a federal statute which carried a maximum sentence of five years. Id.

laId. at 193-95.
17Id. at 195.
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Having found prosecution by federal authorities after a similar
state action unproscribed by the fifth amendment in Lanza and
Abbate, the Supreme Court determined in Bartkus v. Illinoiss that

state prosecution subsequent to federal proceedings was not inconsistent with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 9
Echoing the Lanza-Abbate rationale, the Court emphasized the
dichotomy of interests affected to conclude that allowing a prior federal adjudication to preclude state proceedings would improperly
eviscerate the state's power to vindicate its interest in the conduct
involved 2 and displace the reserved power of the states over crimes.2'
Suggesting that the Constitution was primarily intended to limit the
power of the federal government rather than that of the states, the
Court held that recognition of the importance of the state's police
power was necessary to preserve the federal system as originally envisioned.

22

While the rules governing successive prosecutions by state and
federal authorities devolve from an interpretation of the allocation
of powers to each authority as delineated by the Constitution, all
powers within an individual state repose in the state government,
subject to allocation according to the requirements of the state constitution and preferences of the legislature. 23 In all states, some
18

359 U.S. 121 (1959), noted in Note, 19 LA. L. REv. 877 (1959); Note, 38 TEXAS L.

REv. 114 (1959); and Note, 34 TUL. L. Rav. 197 (1959).

" The defendant had been convicted by an Illinois state court of a bank robbery
after having been acquitted in a United States district court in Illinois of a charge
based upon the same conduct. The Supreme Court upheld his conviction. The
defendant could not rely on the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment
as a bar to his second prosecution, the state prosecution, since the Supreme Court has
not extended federal double jeopardy standards to the states. 359 U.S. at 139; see
Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 426 (1953); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
322-28 (1937); note 37 infra.
20359 U.S. at 137. The conduct involved was robbery of a federally insured bank.
Thus, the argument is relatively easily made that the state and federal governments
had separate interests in this act, for the federal government's interest in protecting
the integrity of its banking system may be distinguished from the interest of the state
in maintaining peace and order.
-1See note 41 infra and accompanying text.
"2 See 359 U.S. at 137. The Court also carefully reviewed the precedents in this
area, concluding that: "[W]ith this body of precedent as irrefutable evidence that state
and federal courts have for years refused to bar a second trial even though there had
been a prior trial by another government for a similar offense, it would be disregard
of a long, unbroken, unquestioned course of impressive adjudication for the Court now
to rule that due process compels such a bar." Id. at 136.
23See notes 42-48 infra and accompanying text. See also Annot., 174 A.L.R. 1343
(1948).
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part of the police power is delegated to municipal corporations which
are authorized to enact ordinances regulating conduct within the
municipality. Where such ordinances proscribe acts identical to
those prohibited by a state enactment, the majority of states have
determined separate and successive prosecutions permissible upon
a variety of rationales. 24 Some courts consider municipal prosecu24The question of successive municipal and state prosecutions arises, of course,
when an individual is prosecuted first by a municipality and then by a state. See, e.g.,
State v. Clifford, 45 La. 558, 13 So. 281 (1893); State v. Reid, 19 N.J. Super. 32, 87 A.2d
562 (1952); State v. Tucker, 137 Wash. 162, 242 P. 363 (1926). The issue might also
arise if a municipal prosecution were to follow a state proceeding. However, although
the reasoning of many cases would seem to allow such prosecutions, it seems that they
simply do not occur. The issue does arise when a defendant, having been prosecuted
only by a municipality, appeals from the municipal prosecution alleging that the
ordinance under which he was prosecuted is invalid because a state statute provides
a punishment for the same conduct. The basic argument is that since successive
prosecutions for the same offense are prohibited by the state constitution, a
municipal proceeding would preclude a state prosecution, thereby interfering with
the administration of state laws and thus requiring the invalidity of the ordinance.
See, e.g., Theisen v. McDavid, 34 Fla. 440, 16 So. 321 (1894) (ordinance held valid);
Billings v. Herold, 130 Mont. 138, 296 P.2d 263 (1956) (ordinance held invalid); Ex
parte Sloan, 47 Nev. 109, 217 P. 233 (1923) (ordinance held valid). See generally
Grant, Penal Ordinances and the Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy, 25 GEo. LJ.
293 (1937); Gross, supra note 13; Kneier, Prosecution Under State Law and Municipal
Ordinance as Double Jeopardy, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 201 (1931); Comment, Double
Jeopardy Where Both City and State Prosecute the Same Act, 38 WASH. L. REv. 819
(1963).
The problem of successive prosecutions may arise between nations as well as
between state and municipality or the state and federal governments. When two or
more nations have concurrent jurisdiction, trial in a foreign country would seem to
bar retrial in the United States. See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184,
197 (1820). An exception is made for certain acts, generally political in nature, which
raise different issues in each jurisdiction. Thus, an American in a foreign country who
steals secret American documents may be prosecuted abroad for theft and in the United
States for treason. See Franck, An International Lawyer Looks at the Barthus Rule,
34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1096, 1101-02 (1959). See also Grant, Successive Prosecutions by
State and Nation: Common Law and British Empire Comparisons, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
1 (1956).
Moreover, treaties or acts of Congress may give rise to concurrent jurisdiction between states over waterways in which each has an interest. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 14,
1859, ch. 33, §§ 1-2, 11 Stat. 383. In this situation, the Supreme Court has proscribed
successive prosecutions by providing that the judgment of the state first acquiring
jurisdiction of the person will be binding upon both states. Nielsen v. Oregon, 212
U.S. 315, 320 (1909).
It may be noted that a prosecution by a municipality does not bar a subsequent
prosecution by the federal government. Smith v. United States, 243 F.2d 877 (6th
Cir. 1957); United States v. Peterson, 268 F. 864 (W.D. Wash. 1920). Opportunities
for repetitive prosecutions also arise between a territorial government and the federal
government, as well as between military and civil courts. See note 50 infra and
accompanying text. The problem of successive prosecutions based upon the same
conduct is to be distinguished from the problem of determining when particular acts
have violated two statutes, or two ordinances. If more than one state statute has been
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tions "civil" in nature and consequently no bar to state criminal
proceedings.26 Others maintain that certain acts are of greater
gravity when committed within a municipality,26 or characterize
one act as a separate offense against each government.2 It is also
violated, for example, the defendant may be punished twice by the state, once for
each violation. The rule in many states and in the federal courts is that one act may
be an "offense" against more than one statute, if each statute requires proof of an
additional fact. This is termed the "same evidence" test. See Gavieres v. United
States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911); Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata,
39 IowA L. Rv. 317 (1954); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE LJ. 262 (1965).
22 See, e.g., State v. Garner, 360 Mo. 50, 226 S.W.2d 604 (1950); State v. Muir, 164
Mo. 610, 65 S.W.2d 285 (1901); State v. Hauser, 137 Neb. 138, 288 N.W. 518 (1939);
Mullins v. State, 214 Tenn. 366, 380 S.W.2d 201 (1964); Milwaukee v. Johnson, 192
Wis. 585, 213 N.W. 335 (1927). Characterizing a municipal proceeding as a "civil"
proceeding has consequences not only with regard to protection against double
jeopardy, but also with regard to other rights of the defendant, such as the right to
trial by jury. See State v. Amick, 173 Neb. 770, 114 N.W.2d 893 (1962) (defendant
denied trial by jury). See generally 1 C. ANTiAu, MuNic AL CORPOrATION LAw §§ 4A.
00-.14 (1967). The civil character of proceedings to enforce municipal ordinances is a
reflection of common law procedure. At common law, municipal ordinances could
prescribe only pecuniary penalties. C. TIEDEMAN, A TREATIsE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
COmORATONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 154 (1894). The method of enforcing the
ordinances was by an action of debt or assumpsit brought in the name of the
municipal corporation or the proper official against the wrongdoer. However, the
action could not be brought in a municipal court "for to suffer this would be to allow
one to be judge in his own case;" thus, resort to some cther court was necessary,
"usually one of the courts at Westminster Hall." J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF STATUTORY CRimES § 403, at 270 (1873). At common law, the proceeding to
enforce a municipal ordinance was ciearly a civil proceeding. However, the differences between the common law procedure and a present-day prosecution in a municipal
court empowered to impose jail sentences would seem evident. Thus, characterizing
the latter proceeding as "civil" seems untenable. See Gross, supra note 13.
208
See Van Buren v. Wells, 53 Ark. 368, 14 S.W. 38 (1890); Ex parte Sloan, 47
Nev. 109, 217 P. 233 (1923). A statute has since limited one of these cases. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 43-1225 (1964). It has also been argued that a municipality and a state should
both be allowed to prohibit and punish the same conduct since "[t]he offense against the
corporation and the State . . . are distinguishable, and wholly disconnected, and the
prosecution at the suit of each proceeds upon a different hypothesis-the one contemplates the observance of the peace and good order of the city-the other has a more
enlarged object in view, the maintenance of the peace and dignity of the State." Mayor
& Aldermen v. Allaire, 14 Ala. 400, 403 (1848); accord, State v. Quong, 8 Idaho 191,
67 P. 491 (1902); State v. Clifford, 45 La. 558, 13 So. 281 (1893); State v. Mills, 108 W.
Va. 31, 150 S.E. 142 (1929). See also 6 E. McQuuLN, THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 23.10 (1949).
27 See, e.g., Bueno v. State, 40 Fla. 160, 23 So. 862 (1898); Theisen v. McDavid, 34
Fla. 440, 16 So. 321 (1894); People v. Behymer, 48 I11. App. 2d 218, 198 N..2d 729
(1964); State v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445, 13 N.W. 913 (1882); St. Louis v. Mueller, 313
S.W.2d 189 (Mo. 1958); In re Monroe, 13 Okla. Crim. 62, 162 P. 233 (1917); State v.
Tucker, 137 Wash. 162, 242 P. 363 (1926). Terming one "act" an "offense" against
two governments is, of course, the same sort of reasoning which has been used to support successive state-federal prosecutions. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying
text. This analogy has not been overlooked by the state courts. See Theisen v.
McDavid, supra at 443, 15 So. at 322. In other cases, the courts have distinguished
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contended that impermissible detriment to state law enforcement
would ensue if municipal adjudications barred subsequent state proceedings. 28 Conversely, a minority of states have prohibited successive state and local proceedings by reference to a double jeopardy
provision in the state constitution, 29 judicial rule invalidating ordinances prohibiting conduct punishable under state statutes,30 or legislative proscription.3 '
According to the allegations in Ladd, no special rule or statute is
necessary to preclude successive prosecutions by state and municipal
authorities since such a proscription is compelled by the fifth amendment. Rejecting Ladd's contention, the district court held that the
between the "police regulations" enforced by the municipalities and the "judicial
power" of the state. Shafer v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331 (1861); State v. Sly, 4 Ore. 277
(1872). See generally Kneier, supra note 24; Note, 86 MINN. L. REv. 143 (1952).
See Robbins v. People, 95 IUl. 175 (1880). It has been noted that if a municipal
prosecution were to preclude a state prosecution, the result would be "the anomaly of
the same crime being liable to be punished in as many various ways as there are
cities and villages in the state, and of the same crimes when committed within the
limits of a city or village being punishable only by a petty fine, which, if committed
in the rural districts of the state, would be punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison." State v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445, 461, 13 N.W. 913, 919 (1882) (concurring opinion).
Other courts have allowed successive municipal and state prosecutions by yielding to
the weight of authority without considering the rationale involved. See Inman v. State,
39 Ala. App. 496, 497, 104 So. 2d 448, 450 (1958); Taylor v. Curry, 215 Ga. 734, 113
S.E.2d 398 (1960); Johnson v. State, 59 Miss. 543 (1882); Koch v. State, 53 Ohio St. 433,
41 N.E. 689 (1895).
29 People v. Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 42 N.W. 1124 (1889); cf. Northville v. Westfall, 75 Mich. 603, 42 N.W. 1068 (1889).
3o See In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142, 14 P. 405 (1887); State v. Welch, 36 Conn. 215 (1869);
Southport v. Ogden, 23 Conn. 128 (1854); Billings v. Herold, 180 Mont. 138, 296 P.2d
263 (1956); Grant, Penal Ordinances and the Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy, 25
GEo. L.J. 293 (1937); Comment, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 430 (1963).
81For example, the Rhode Island statute provides: "No ordinance or regulation
whatsoever, made by a town council, shall impose or at anytime be construed to continue to impose, any penalty for the commission or omission of any act punishable as
a crime, misdemeanor or offense, by the statute law of the state." R.I. GEN. LAWS
Other states allow concurrent jurisdiction but permit only one
ANN. § 45-6-6 (1956).
prosecution. Thus, for example, the Kentucky constitution provides: "No municipal
ordinance shall fix a penalty for a violation thereof at less than that imposed by
statute for the same offense. A conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute
a bar to another prosecution for the same offense." Ky. CONST. § 168. Protection
from double punishment but not double prosecution is provided by still other states.
An Arkansas statute provides: "Whenever any party shall have been convicted before
any police or mayor's court or before any justice of the peace or circuit court said
conviction shall be a bar to further prosecution before any police or mayor's court or
justice of the peace or circuit court for such offense or for any misdemeanor embraced
in the act committed; Provided, no such conviction before any police or mayor's
court shall be a bar unless the penalty imposed is at least the minimum penalty prescribed by state laws for the same offense or act." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1225 (1947).
See generally Gross, supra note 13, at 291-95.
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double jeopardy provision was ineffective in this context since it
is not presently applicable to the states.3 2 Moreover, the court added
that even were the provision applicable, Ladd's petition would nevertheless be denied since prosecution for the same conduct by both the
state and the municipality is indistinguishable from the constitutionally permissible practice of repetitive adjudications by the state
and federal governments. 33
Although the court's analogy may seem superficially correct,3 4
an analysis of the nature of the municipality/state and state/federal
relationships indicates that they are not comparable. 35 Thus, the
district court may have incorrectly concluded that an application of
the double jeopardy provision would permit successive local and
state prosecutions. Moreover, it may be contended that regardless
of the requirements of the double jeopardy clause, such successive
32 270 F. Supp. at 296.

33 Id. Citing Lanza, Abbate, and Bartkus, the court relied on two Louisiana cases,
State v. Fourcade, 45 La. 408, 13 So. 187 (1893); and State v. Clifford, 45 La. 558, 13
So. 281 (1898), in which the state court had held that successive municipal and state
prosecutions were permissible. The court also relied on a Louisiana statute which
provides: "Double jeopardy does not apply to a prosecution under a law enacted by
the Louisiana Legislature if the prior jeopardy was in a prosecution under the laws
of another state, the United States, or under a municipal or parochial ordinance."
LA. CODE CRima. PRoc. ANN. art. 597 (1967). In addition, the court cited Barnett v.
Gladden, 255 F. Supp. 450 (D. Ore. 1966). In that case the court stated, "a single act
may constitute an offense against a municipality and a crime against a state," because
the municipal and state courts do not derive "their authority from the same sovereign. Here, the municipal ordinance derive[s] its authority from the city of Pendleton, while the statute derive[s] its authority from the state of Oregon." Id. at 453-54.
34 The relationship of the states to the federal government under the United States
Constitution is somewhat analogous to the relationship of municipalities to the states
under the constitutions of home-rule states, such as Louisiana. Control of local matters
is reserved to the states by the Federal Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. X. Similarly, power over local matters is explicitly reserved to municipalities by constitutional
home-rule provisions. For example, the Louisiana constitution provides: "The City
of New Orleans . . . shall have the right and authority to adopt and enforce local
police, sanitary and similar regulations to do and perform all of the acts pertaining to
its local affairs, property, and government, which are necessary or proper in the legitimate exercise of its corporate powers and municipal functions." LA. CONST. art. 14,
§ 22; see State v. Steward, 152 Md. 419, 187 A. 39 (1927) (statute purporting to regulate
vehicular traffic in Baltimore held to be unconstitutional attempt to legislate on a
subject reserved to municipality by state constitution). See generally 1 C. ANTIEAU,
supra note 25, §§ 3.00-.36; Comment, 36 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 430, 431 (1963). However, regardless of the relationship between municipalities and the state which is established
by a state constitution, the recognition which is given to municipalities under the
Federal Constitution would seem to be controlling in determining the validity of successive municipal and state prosecutions under the double jeopardy provision of the
fifth amendment or the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See notes 4248 infra and accompanying text.
31See notes 39-48 infra and accompanying text.
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prosecutions are violative of the standards imposed by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 6
Assuming that the double jeopardy proscription of the fifth
amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment,T the rationale in Lanza and Abbate88 by which successive
state and federal prosecutions are made consistent with that provision is arguably unavailable when the prosecuting entities are the
municipality and the state. The permissibility of multiple statefederal prosecutions is based upon the constitutionally delineated
nature of the governmental units. As interpreted by the Supreme
80 Ladd's limitation of his petition to the double jeopardy contention may be
ascribable to the fact that he drew the petition without the aid of an attorney. 270
F. Supp. at 295. However, the court receiving a habeas corpus petition is not limited
to considering the arguments there raised. See Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
In Price the Supreme Court held that a lower court had improperly denied a writ of
habeas corpus since "[t]he primary purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is to make
certain that a man is not unjustly imprisoned. And if for some justifiable reason he
was . . . unaware of the significance of relevant facts, it is neither necessary nor
reasonable to deny him all opportunity of obtaining judicial relief. . . . Since
[prisoners] . . . act so often as their own counsel in habeas corpus proceedings, we
cannot impose on them the same high standards of the legal art which we might
place on the members of the legal profession." Id. at 291-92. See also De Coster v.
Madigan, 223 F.2d 906, 909 (7th Cir. 1955).
8
7In Palko v. Connecticut, 202 U.S. 819 (1937), the Supreme Court decided that the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment was not applicable to the states. However, the court in Ladd notes that there is a "distinct possibility" that the double
jeopardy provision will soon be applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 270 F. Supp. at 296, citing Chicos v. Indiana, 885 U.S. 76 (1966); accord, Robinson v. Henderson, 268 F. Supp. 849, 850-51 (E.D. Tenn. 1967). In Chicos the "petitioner presented a single question in his petition for certiorari . . . . Is the Fifth

Amendment's prohibition against placing an accused in double jeopardy applicable
to state court prosecutions under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?" 385 U.S. at 77. Because of other considerations, the Court did not reach
this question, dismissing the writ as improvidently granted. However, the mere
fact that certiorari was granted in Chicos may indicate a willingness on the part of
the Court to re-examine the applicability of the double jeopardy provision to the states.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in recent years has substantially increased the procedural
safeguards afforded criminal defendants in the state courts through incorporation of
various provisions of the first eight amendments into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., KIopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 218 (1967)
(sixth amendment right to speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 880 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth
amendment right to confront witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 85
(1963) (sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel). Thus, there seems at least a
possibility that Palko will be overruled and federal double jeopardy standards applied
to the states. See United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 848 F.2d 844, 854.56, 868
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913 (1966). For a discussion of the extent and
process of incorporation see Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth
A'nendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963); Weihofen, Supreme Court Review of State Criminal Procedure, 10 Am. J. LEGAL Hisr. 189 (1966).
B8See notes 10-17 supra and accompanying text.
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Court, the Constitution recognizes the federal and state governments
40
as independent sovereignties, 3 9 each possessing inherent powers.
41
One of these powers belonging to the states is the police power,
under which the state governments may define and punish crimes.
In contrast, municipalities are given no cognizance by the Constitution; but rather, are regarded as instrumentalities of the state created
to assist in its governmental functions. 42 Thus, in enacting and enforcing ordinances, these local units merely exercise a delegated portion of the states' police power. 43 The dominion of state legislatures
over such units is virtually unlimited.44 The legislatures may create
or destroy municipalities, change their boundaries, 45 or limit their
powers. 46 In light of these considerations andthe fact that the state
81Recognition of the state and federal governments as independent sovereignties
under the Constitution is fundamental to the Lanza, Abbate, and Bartkus decisions.
See notes 10-22 supra and accompanying text. In Lanza the Court emphasized,
"We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of
dealing with the same subject matter within the same territory....

Each government

in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity is exercising its
own sovereignty, not that of the other." 260 U.S. at 382. This characterization was
echoed by Abbate and Bartkus. In both cases the Court quoted from Moore v.
Illinois, 55 U.S. 13 (1852): "'Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a
State or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be
liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either.'" Abbate v. United
States, 359 U.S. at 192; Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. at 131.
40 See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
41 United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295-96 (1935). The Supreme Court
has been careful to recognize the importance of the police power in the role of the
states under the federal system. For example, in Bartkus the Court spoke of "the
historic right and obligation of the States to maintain peace and order within their
confines," 359 U.S. at 137, and in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 468 (1958), noted
that "it has long been recognized as the very essence of our federalism that the States
should have the widest latitude in the administration of their own systems of criminal
justice."
See notes 46 & 48 infra.
42 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964).
48 See Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U.S. 394, 397-99 (1919); Williams
v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 310 (1898); New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co.,
142 U.S. 79, 90-91 (1891); Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U.S. 307, 308 (1875).
1 The power of state legislatures over municipalities is not limited by the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. Williams v. Baltimore,
289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933). Nor is it limited by the equal protection clause, Newark v. New
Jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196 (1923), nor by the contract clause, Trenton v. New Jersey,
262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923). But cf. note 45 infra.
15 See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907). The power of the state legislature
to alter municipal boundaries is, however, limited by the fifteenth amendment as
demonstrated by Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). In Gomillion the Court
held that an act of the Alabama legislature modifying the boundaries of the city of
Tuskegee would be unconstitutional if it were shown that the consequence of the act
was the deprivation of Negro voting rights.
48 See Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
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government is not considered a subordinate unit of the federal government, 47 the Supreme Court has fully rejected the contention
that a municipality is related to the state as the latter is to the federal
government. 48 Consequently, since the municipality/state relation
may not validly be considered the equivalent of the state/federal
relationship, the "separate sovereignties" concept by which successive
state and federal prosecutions are justified is inapplicable to permit
multiple adjudications by municipal and state governments under an application of the double jeopardy clause. Rather, since the
local government is in theory at one with the state as only a subordinate unit thereof, local and state prosecutions in series may constitute double jeopardy on the ground that they are in reality successive prosecutions by the state itself.49
'7See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
,8 Explaining why representation in state legislatures must be apportioned on the
basis of population, although representation in the United States Senate is not so
determined, the Supreme Court stated: "Admittedly, the original 13 States surrendered
some of their sovereignty in agreeing to join together 'to form a more perfect Union.'
But at the heart of our constitutional system remains the concept of separate and
distinct governmental entities which have delegated some, but not all, of their
formerly held powers to the single national government. . . . Political subdivisions
of States-counties, cities, or whatever-never were and never have been considered as
sovereign entities. Rather, they have been traditionally regarded as subordinate gov.
ernmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state
governmental functions. As stated by the Court in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207
U.S. 161, 178, these governmental units are 'created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them,' and
the 'number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon [them] ... and the
territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the
State.' The relationship of the States to the Federal Government could hardly be less
analogous." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 574-75 (1964) (emphasis added).
49The double jeopardy provision has led to a number of rules regarding federal
prosecutions which would likely similarly govern state prosecutions if the provision
were extended to them. Since multiple punishments are considered to be contrary
to the policies embodied in the double jeopardy provision, retrial after a conviction
is forbidden. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168-70 (1873). Moreover, retrial for the same offense after an acquittal is proscribed. United States v. Ball,
163 U.S. 662 (1896). Thus, the federal government may not appeal a verdict of
acquittal. Cf. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). Similarly, reprosecution
after an "implicit" acquittal is prohibited. Thus, a defendant cannot be retried for
first degree murder after an appeal from a conviction of second degree murder since
he has been impliedly acquitted of the former charge. Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184 (1957).
Jeopardy is said to attach when the jury has been impanelled and sworn, Cornero
v. United States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931), or when a court in a non-jury trial has
begun to hear evidence, McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 610 (1936). After jeopardy attaches, if the trial is terminated for reasons other
than those of "manifest necessity," retrial is not allowed. Downum v. United States,
372 U.S. 734 (1963) (reprosecution not permitted when absence of government wit-
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This application of the double jeopardy proscription is further
compelled by analogy to the treatment accorded successive territorial
and federal adjudications. Since the laws and judicial authority of
the federal and territorial governments emanate from a single sovereignty-the federal government-the Supreme Court has indicated
that multiple prosecutions by these governmental units would contravene fifth amendment requirements. 50 Moreover, because neither
territorial nor municipal governments have independent powers, the
relationship of a territory to the federal government has been characterized by the Court as analogous to the relationship of a municipality to a state. 51 Thus, the single source of power rationale which
precludes prosecution by both territorial and federal governments
would seem equally compelling in the context of successive municipal
and state prosecutions and would suggest a result contrary to that
ness led to discharge of first jury and impanelling of second only two days later);

United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824) (retrial permitted when the first
trial ended with a hung jury); see Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HAav. L. REy. 1272 (1964).
o See Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 264 (1937). In addition to proscribing
successive prosecutions by a territorial government and the federal government in
Puerto Rico, the Supreme Court in Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907),
held that a defendant cannot be prosecuted by a territorial court after having been
acquitted in a United States military court of charges arising out of the same conduct.
In Grafton the Court explicitly rejected the reasoning of those cases allowing successive
state and federal prosecutions, stating that they are inapplicable "where the two
tribunals . . . exert all their powers under and by authority of the same government .... ." Id. at 355. Adopting the rationale of these decisions, it has been held
that an individual who has been placed in jeopardy in a federal court cannot subsequently be tried in a military court for the same conduct. United States ex rel.
Pasela v. Fenno, 76 F. Supp. 203 (D. Conn. 1947), aff'd, 167 F.2d 593 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 334 U.S. 857, cert. dismissed per stipulation, 335 U.S. 806 (1948). Similarly,
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that a defendant who has been
convicted by the United States Court of the Allied High Commission of Germany cannot be retried by a federal court because both tribunals derive their authority from
the same sovereign. Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 814 (1962). However, consistent with the separate sovereignties concept supporting successive state and federal prosecutions, prosecutions in both a state court
and a military court have been permitted. Thompson v. WiUingham, 217 F. Supp.
901 (M.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 518 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1963); People v. Wendel, 59 Misc. 354,
112 N.Y.S. 301 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
51Discussing the nature of territorial authority, the Court stated that a territory "is
not a distinct sovereignty. It has no independent powers. It is a political community
organized by Congress, all whose powers are created by Congress, and all whose
acts are subject to Congressional supervision. Its attitude to the general government
is no more independent than that of a city to the State in which it is situated, and
which has given to it its municipal organization." Talbott v. Silver Bow County, 139 U.S.
438, 446 (1891); see National Bank v. Yankton, 101 U.S. 129 (1879) (congressional control over territories comparable to state power over municipalities).
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reached by the Ladd court. Clearly, insofar as the rationale permitting prosecution by both the state and federal governments is
based upon the nature of those governments as independent sovereignties, it is inapplicable to successive prosecutions by a city govern52
ment and a state.
In conjunction with the theory of separate sovereignties, successive
state and federal prosecutions are sustained by resort to the assertion
that each unit may have a separate interest in particular conduct."
Since the state and federal governments derive their authority from
separate sources, 54 it may be assumed that their criminal laws represent independent interests related to the particular powers by which
they are enacted. 55 On the other hand, both state and local govern"' In Robinson v. Henderson, 268 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Tenn. 1967), it was recognized
that the rationale justifying successive federal and state prosecutions cannot be used
to support successive municipal and state prosecutions. In that case, the petitioner
alleged that his trial in county criminal court for assault with intent to commit first
degree murder following his trial in a city court for assault and battery, both trials
arising out of the same occurrence, violated rights guaranteed to him by the United
States Constitution. Id. at 350. Noting that the United States Constitution does not
bar federal prosecution following prosecution by the state, nor the obverse, the district
court nevertheless concluded that the principles governing such prosecutions were not
controlling in the case at hand "because of the distinction between the federal-state
relationship and the state-city relationship." Id. at 351-52. However, the court
denied the petition on other grounds. See note 69 infra.
' See notes 16 & 20 supra and accompanying text.
r* See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
The argument that the state and federal governments have separate interests in
particular conduct and that therefore a federal prosecution is necessary and proper
after a state prosecution in order to protect a separate federal interest is especially
compelling in the civil rights area, since certain states have demonstrated a reluctance
to punish those interfering with the interests of disfavored minority groups. For example, prosecution under a federal statute prohibiting denial of rights secured by the
United States Constitution would presumably not be permissible in the absence of
the Lanza and Abbate rule if the defendants had already been acquitted in a state
court proceeding of charges based on the same conduct. However, Lanza and Abbate
act to permit prosecutions as in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), where
after acquittal in a state alleged murderers of a Negro in a southern state were
indicted in the federal court. In such a case, the state's interest in maintaining peace
and order, reflected in its statute proscribing murder, may be distinguished from the
interest of the federal government in protecting the civil rights of all citizens. See
Note, Double Prosecution by State and Federal Governments: Another Exercise in
Federalism, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1538 (1967).
However, the arguments in favor of multiple prosecutions by the state and federal
governments have not been convincing to all those who have considered the problem.
In fact, dissatisfaction with the Lanza, Abbate, and Bartkus decisions was manifest
soon after they were announced. After Lanza, New York repealed its alcohol prohibition law. Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions,32 COLUm. L. REv. 1309,
1310 (1932). Subsequent to Abbate, the U.S. Attorney General ordered that no federal
prosecution be brought after a state prosecution without his personal approval. Attorney General's Directive, 27 U.S.L.W. 2509 (1959); see Petite v. United States, 361
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ments derive their power from the inherent authority of the former,
and the local unit may not assert an independent interest.56 When
the state delegates the authority to enact and enforce an ordinance to
a municipality, the effect is merely to permit the local government
to protect a state interest rather than to give rise to an independent
municipal interest. Underlying such a delegation may be the
assumption that the concentration of population within the municipality's boundaries will lead to a greater likelihood of transgression
of the state's interest. Administrative efficiency, therefore, dictates
U.S. 529, 531 (1960), citing Department of Justice Press Release, April 6, 1959. Following Bartkus Illinois passed a statute prohibiting retrial by the state after a federal
trial. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-4 (Smith-Hurd 1964). The Illinois statute provides that a "prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted in a
District Court of the United States or in a sister State for an offense which is within
the concurrent jurisdiction of this State .... ." Id. A number of other states also
have promulgated statutes barring a state prosecution after a prosecution by the
federal government. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.11, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1956).
Many commentators have criticized the Lanza, Abbate, and Bartkus cases. See
Fisher, supra note 9; Franck, supra note 24; Grant, supra; Newman, Double Jeopardy
and the Problem of Successive Prosecutions: A Suggested Solution, 34 S. CAL. L. REv.
252 (1961); Pontikes, Dual Sovereignty and Double Jeopardy: A Critique of Bartkus v.
Illinois and Abbate v. United States, 14 W. Ras. L. REv. 700 (1963); Note, Double
Prosecution by State and Federal Governments: Another Exercise in Federalism, 80
HARv. L. REv. 1538 (1967). But see Note, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 574 (1960).
In Bartkus the Supreme Court itself seemed somewhat dissatisfied with the result.
After noting "the concern of the Founders in devising a federal system," 359 U.S. at
137, the Court added: "The greatest self-restraint is necessary when that federal system
yields results with which a court is in little sympathy." Id. at 138. Mr. Justice
Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas, protested strongly in
dissents to both Bartkus and Abbate. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. at 150-64; Abbate
v. United States, 359 U.S. at 201-04. In Barthus he wrote: "I think double prosecutions for the same offense are so contrary to the spirit of our free country that they
violate . . . the prevailing view of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
"The Court apparently takes the position that a second trial for the same act is
somehow less offensive if one of the trials is conducted by the Federal Government
and the other by a State. Looked at from the standpoint of the individual who is
being prosecuted, this notion is too subtle for me to grasp." 359 U.S. at 150-51,
155. In Abbate he added: "I am also not convinced that a State and the Nation can
be considered two wholly separate sovereignties for the purpose of allowing them to
do together what, generally, neither can do separately. .
. I believe the Bill of
Rights' safeguard against double jeopardy was intended to establish a broad national
policy against federal courts trying or punishing a man a second time after acquittal
or conviction in any court." 359 U.S. at 203.
Chief Justice Warren's views on successive state-federal prosecutions are revealed
in his opinion in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956): "We are not unmindful
of the risk of compounding punishments which would be created by finding concurrent
state power .... Without compelling indication to the contrary, we will not assume
that Congress intended to permit the possibility of double punishment." Id. at 50910.
r1 See notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text.
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localized attention. Further, to the extent that possible infringements of state interests stem from conditions which are local in
nature, such as industrialization, high population density, or concentration of minority groups, understanding of these peculiarities
necessitates the continued and immediate contact best achieved
through local administrative units. 57

Although local officials may

have an immediate interest in certain conduct which is particularly
troublesome within the municipality, no power to punish such conduct is given municipal courts unless the state considers its interest
so strong as to require local enforcement.58 An argument based upon
separate interests seems incompetent to justify multiple municipal
and state prosecutions, and since such adjudication is in effect a
double prosecution by the state,59 a violation of the double jeopardy
clause should ensue.
5 Professor McQuillin, reflecting the views of many state courts, has advanced an
argument which suggests that successive municipal and state prosecutions should be
allowed because each governmental unit has an interest in the acts of misconduct
committed within municipalities. For him, "common experience has shown that in
view of the rapid increase of urban development more rigid and detailed regulations
ordinarily are required in urban than in rural sections of the state. Clearly many acts
are far more injurious and the temptation to commit them is much greater in congested centers than in the state at large, and when these acts are committed in such
centers they are not only injurious to the public at large in the same way that they
would be if they were committed outside these centers, but they constitute additional
injury to the inhabitants of the congested centers where they occur. It follows that
there is a basis for regarding such an act both as an offense against the people of
the state at large and against the inhabitants of the local community." 6 E. McQULLIN, supra note 26, § 23.10. However, contrary to Professor McQuillin's analysis,
it would seem that an act of misconduct committed within a municipality is not a
separate offense against the people of the state and against the inhabitants of the local
community. Rather, it is an offense against the state only as it is an offense against
the local community. It is, thus, one offense, not two. The fact that the municipality
possesses an interest does not mean that interest is perceptibly distinguishable from
that held by the state.
"' See notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text.
"' See note 49 supra and accompanying text. The court in Canon City v. Merris,
137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958), recognized that "[a] municipality is an agency of
the state .

. .

. The state may not prosecute a defendant twice for an offense, and

this being so, it is difficult to find a sanction for permitting the state to do indirectly
through its agent what it cannot do directly." Id. at 181, 323 P.2d at 620. However,
other courts, while recognizing that municipalities are merely subordinate units of
the state government, have nevertheless held that successive municipal and state prosecutons are not precluded by the double jeopardy provision of the state constitution.
See State v. Reid, 19 NJ. Super. 32, 87 A.2d 562 (1952); State v. Tucker, 137 Wash.
162, 242 P. 363 (1926).
It has been suggested that the latter result is defensible, although the reasoning
is unsound, because "constitutional rights can be disregarded in petty cases ....
The
elements of oppression or harassment historically aimed at by the constitutional and
common law prohibition [against double jeopardy] are not significantly involved."
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Even in the absence of the double jeopardy provision, it may be
contended that successive prosecutions by local and state governments
are violative of the standards presently imposed on the states by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Palho v. Connecticut6 the Supreme Court ruled that multiple prosecutions by a
state would, at an indeterminate point, offend the standards imposed
upon the the states by the due process clause. 61 Conceiving the
proper test to be whether the successive prosecutions in a particular
case violate "fundmental principles of liberty and justice," 62 the
State v. Currie, 41 N.J. 531, 543, 197 A.2d 678, 685 (1964), quoted in Fisher, Double
Jeopardy: Six Common Boners Summarized, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 81, 94 (1967). It has
been noted that other constitutional guaranties, such as trial by jury, have been held
to be inapplicable to petty offenses. "Today, the economic burden on society and the
accused would be prohibitive if petty cases were to be tried with the full paraphernalia now required to protect the accused in trials involving his constitutional
rights." Fisher, supra at 95. However, it would seem that these contentions do not
justify successive municipal and state prosecutions. Imprisonment for ninety days
(Ladd's punishment in the municipal court) cannot be considered minor. The consequences in terms of reputation or loss of employment, for example, may be quite farreaching. Although, historically, successive municipal and state prosecutions probably were not comprehended by the prohibition against double jeopardy, the character of municipal proceedings has changed greatly since then. See note 25 supra.
Moreover, the practical considerations of judicial economy and administrative efficiency,
which would suggest that such safeguards as trial by jury be dispensed with in certain
cases, do not suggest that the protection afforded by the double jeopardy provision be
disregarded; rather, convenience would seem to demand that it be applied.
00302 U.S. 319 (1937). See note 63 infra.
01"In a series of cases commencing ten years after Palko, an assumption, certainly
of the persuasion of a holding, gradually arose that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment did impose some restrictions on the power of a state to reprosecute an individual for the same crime." United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins,
348 F.2d 844, 851 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913 (1966). Thus, in Louisiana
ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), the Supreme Court stated: "Our minds
rebel against permitting the same sovereignty to punish an accused twice for the same
offense." Id. at 462. In Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948), the Court was willing
to consider the petitioner's claim that sentencing under a state recidivist statute unconstitutionally subjected him to double jeopardy. Moreover, the opinion in Brock
v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953), quoted from Palko to ask: "'Is that kind of
double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it?'" Id. at 427 (emphasis added). Ultimately,
in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), the Court ciearly found Palko to mean that
"at some point the cruelty of harassment by multiple prosecutions by a state would
offend due process .... ." Id. at 127; see Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
See also Ciucd v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958). However, the procedure involved in each
of these cases was determined to be constitutionally permissible. Nevertheless, it may
be contended that the point of impermissible harassment may be passed in successive
prosecutions by state and municipality. See Comment, Double Jeopardy Where Both
City and State Prosecute the Same Act, 38 WASH. L. REV. 819, 830 (1963); note 65
infra and accompanying text.
02302 U.S. at 328. Some protection against successive prosecutions would seem to be
fundamental to our law since the principle of double jeopardy was a part of the
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Court determined that the procedure in Palko, retrial of an accused
after an appeal by the state on questions of law, was not inconsistent
with due process. 63 Significantly, however, the Court distinguished
this procedure from retrial by the state after a trial free of error
prejudicial to that party, 64 thereby implicitly suggesting that trial
subsequent to an error-free prosecution would transgress constitutional standards. 65 If validity is given the contention that the municipality is but a subordinate unit of the state, representing the state's
interest and utilizing its power, successive prosecutions by the state
and local governments arguably constitute double prosecution by the
state alone. 66 Thus, to allow such prosecutions would be to permit
the state indirectly to accomplish what would otherwise appear constitutionally impermissible. Moreover, Palko suggests that an aspect
of repetitive state prosecutions bringing them within the proscription
of due process would be their use to "wear out" an initially successful defendant. 67 Since prosecution by a local government and a
English common law. COKE, THE TnIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS o
ENGLAND *213-14. By the time of the adoption of the Constitution, four special pleas
in bar were recognized: autrefois acquit (former acquittal), autrefois convict (former
conviction), autrefois attaint (former attaint), and former pardon. However, the
protection of these pleas was limited to felony prosecutions. 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAPJUS 335 (8th ed. 1778). The double jeopardy concept was also a part of
colonial law. See Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 Am. J. LEGAL HiST. 283
(1963). That the same protection against double jeopardy inheres in due process
because such protection was a part of the common law was recognized in Ex pare
Ulrich, 42 F. 587 (W.D. Mo. 1890).
03 In Palko a defendant convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life
imprisonment was retried after appeal by the state pursuant to a statutory provision,
convicted of first degree murder, and sentenced to death. In upholding the death
penalty and the right of the state to appeal, the Court concluded: "If the trial had
been infected with error adverse to the accused, there might have been review at his
instance, and as often as necessary to purge the vicious taint. A reciprocal privilege,
subject at all times to the discretion of the presiding judge . . . has now been granted
to the state." 302 U.S. at 328.
The double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment has been interpreted as
precluding an appeal by the federal government after an acquittal. Kepner v. United
States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). Thus, in order to uphold an appeal by the state in Palho,
the Supreme Court necessarily had to hold that the standards imposed on the federal
government by the fifth amendment clause are not applicable to the states through
incorporation into the fourteenth amendment.
6, 302 U.S. at 328.
65 See Fisher, supra note 59, at 597; cf. United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins,
348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913 (1966).
60 See note 49 supra and accompanying text. See generally Gross, Successive Prosecutions by City and State-The Question of Double Jeopardy, 43 ORE. L. REV. 281 (1964).
67 302 U.S. at 328.
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state would seem especially susceptible to this practice, the effect of
such proceedings as denying due process is enhanced. 8
Beyond the adumbrations of Palko, it may be contended that
successive actions by the state and a municipality are so "fundamentally unfair," 69 based upon a balancing of the conflicting interests
involved,10 as to fall short of the standard of due process. When a
municipality and a state both prosecute an individual, the interest
of the state in enforcing its criminal laws is well protected; it is in
fact vindicated twice. 71 Conversely, the accused must bear the expense of two defenses, the ignominy of two arrests and prosecutions,
and the burden of two punishments. 72 Although reprosecution is
08 Municipal and state officials might easily collaborate in bringing a municipal proceeding prior to a state prosecution in order to test the strength of the defendant's case
or wear down his resistance to contesting his guilt.
00
In Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958), the Supreme Court provided that
"[t]he question in any given case is whether ... a course [of successive prosecution] has
led to fundamental unfairness." Id. at 467. This is an echo of the standard suggested
by the Court in Palko. See note 62 supra and accompanying text. At least one court
has rejected the contention that successive municipal and state prosecutions are "fundamentally unfair" and, therefore, violative of due process. Robinson v. Henderson, 268
F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Tenn. 1967). However, the rule allowing successive municipal and
state prosecutions has borne consistent and extensive criticism. See Grant, Penal
Ordinances and the Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy, 25 GEo. L.J. 293 (1937);
Gross, supra note 66; Kneier, supra note 24; Comment, Double Jeopardy Where Both
City and State Prosecute the Same Act, 38 WAsn. L. R v.819 (1963). Moreover, in State
v. Fourcade, 45 La. 408, 13 So. 187 (1893), one of the cases relied upon by the Ladd
court, the "unfairness" inherent in successive municipal and state convictions was recognized by the conclusion that although such convictions were permissible, "'every fairminded judge will, when pronouncing judgment in the second prosecution or proceeding, consider a penalty already suffered.'" Id. at 413, 13 So. at 190, quoting McInerney
v. Denver, 17 Colo. 302, 307, 29 P. 516, 518 (1892) (emphasis added).
70In Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 128 (1959), the Supreme Court indicated that
a balancing of the relevant factors is required in due process adjudication. The Court
has also indicated that "in all cases involving what is or is not due process . . . no
hard and fast rule can be laid down. The pattern of due process is picked out in the
facts and circumstances of each case." Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 427-28
(1953). See generally Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process AdjudicationA Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
71 In a municipal prosecution, the state's police power is used to protect citizens of
the state who reside in urban areas. If a prosecution by the state follows, it is nothing
less than a second vindication of the interest of those citizens, since the state government
represents all citizens. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
72 The Supreme Court, discussing the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment, has recognized the defendant's interest in avoiding multiple prosecutions, stating
that: "If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is
that no one can be twice lawfully punished for the same offense." Ex parte Lange,
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168 (1873) (emphasis added). "The constitutional prohibition
against 'double jeopardy' was designed to protect an individual from being subjected
to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged
offense....
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
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permissible where the initial failure results from error prejudicial
to the state,7 3 this argument does not compel a conclusion that the
interest may be twice served in light of the heavy burdens placed
upon an accused. 74 Moreover, where the defendant is initially acquitted by the municipality, the operative effect of permitting the
state to reprosecute is to grant the state an opportuniy to "do better
a second time"7 5 and to increase the likelihood of convicting one
wrongly accused.76 Although a second opportunity may be justifiable
so that a societal interest may obtain one vindication, it would appear
fundamentally unfair when the sole effect is to double the prosecutor's chances for success.
Several solutions to the problem of successive prosecutions may
be suggested which would protect the interests of both the individual
and the state. Initially, it would seem that adequate protection of
the individual may be obtained only by a rule which bars successive
prosecutions. It may be assumed that one prosecution by the state
itself should provide adequate opportunity for that unit to test the
American system of jurisprudence, is that the state with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." Green
v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (emphasis added). See generally Note,
Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a loribund
ConstitutionalGuarantee,65 YAL L.J. 339 (1956).
13See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); notes 63-64 supra and accompanying
text.
74 A potential source of "unfairness" would seem to be recidivist statutes, found in
many states, which provide that individuals with a record of prior convictions will
receive harsher sentences than those who have no such record. See generally Note,
40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 332 (1965). If a conviction under a municipal ordinance were used
in a state proceeding based on the same conduct to invoke the operation of a
recidivist statute, the unfairness would seem clear. In effect, an individual would
then become an habitual offender by the commission of only one act and would thus
qualify upon the second trial for the extended sentences furnished recidivists. More.
over, if the initial conviction were used in this manner, conviction of the defendant in
the second trial might be almost a certainty in some states since under the procedure
approved by the Supreme Court in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967), evidence of
former convictions may be presented to the jury along with the evidence of the crime
for which the defendant is presently being tried. See Note, 1967 Duax L.J. 857.
However, in State v. End, 232 Minn. 266, 45 N.W.2d 378 (1950), and Brooker v. State,
312 P.2d 189 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957), it was held that a conviction under a municipal
ordinance is not a conviction within the scope of a state recidivist statute.
7 Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 429 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
It seems dearly "fundamentally unfair" to permit a second prosecution where the
effect is primarily to allow the prosecutor an opportunity to improve his performance.
United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844, 859 (2d Cir. 1965).
76 See Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965).
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validity of an alleged interference with its interest. 77 Therefore, a
system of internal resolution could be used by which, prior to prosecution, the municipality would notify the state of an arrest and the
state would then have the option of prosecuting the defendant
alleged to have committed an act which is punishable under both
municipal and state law. Two prosecutions would be avoided since
either the state or if deemed more appropriate, the local officials, but
not both, would then prosecute the defendant.7 The administrative
cost in such a scheme would not seem sufficient to impeach practicality. Significantly, such a plan would preserve concurrent jurisdiction, thus providing municipal officials with the means of insuring
prosecution of an offender apprehended by them.
On the other hand, a simpler approach to the problem of successive local and state prosecutions would be to dispense with concurrent jurisdiction by a rule that state statutes preempt municipal
ordinances proscribing the same conduct. Such a conclusion would
reflect the predominant authority of the state government and insure
uniformity in the enforcement of the state's policies for only a state
prosecution would result, vindicating its interest. Moreover, if
preemption were utilized, the administrative difficulties and prob7

Although situations may arise in which a municipal prosecution might be felt to

be adequate to protect a state interest, it would seem that a state legislature could
always provide for sufficient protection of that interest by an appropriate proceeding
in a state court under a state statute. The possibility of an inadequate presentation of
the prosecution's case is lessened if the state judiciary is empowered to impose longer
sentences than those available in municipal courts, or if the state police are granted
more extensive investigative facilities. Moreover, in determining the sentence to be
imposed in a state court, a judge might consider the fact that a crime was committed
in a municipality and, thus, may have endangered many people. A single proceeding
in a state court would, of course, avoid the dilemma faced by the court in Ladd.
The court's choice there was narrow: it could allow Ladd to be twice prosecuted and
punished or it could allow him to use his relatively minor sentence under a municipal
ordinance to escape prosecution under the state statute. While the court chose the
former, solution of this action should not be interpreted to mean that two prosecutions
are necessary or even that the court would have reached the same conclusion had
Ladd's two-year sentence under the state statute preceded his municipal trial.
7SA system of resolution among potential prosecutions has been suggested in the
context of the state/federal relationship. "[O]ooperation should extend to prosecution,
so that the enforcement agencies of both governments contribute to the fullest possible
presentation of all the evidence at a single trial in the court mutually adjuded most
appropriate. It might even be inquired whether such desirable cooperation could not
be expedited, on occasion, by state and Congressional enactment authorizing the
bringing of actions under federal law in state courts by joinder to the state prosecution.
The decision in the Barthus case makes such cooperation unnecessary by giving the
prosecutors two tries at a conviction." Franck, An International Lawyer Looks at the
Barthus Rule, 34 N.Y.U.I. REv. 1096, 1103 (1959).
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lems of cooperation between municipal and state officials which might
arise under an internal resolution system would be avoided. In
addition, since all individuals committing the same act of misconduct would be prosecuted by the state, all would have the benefit of
any procedural safeguards available in state, but not in municipal,
proceedings. 79 Thus, no claims of a denial of equal protection
would lie.80 Preemption presently obtains in several states and has
proved to be a workable solution providing adequate protection for
municipal and state residents. 8'
In conclusion, it would seem that the court in Ladd presented
only a superficial analysis of the constitutional problems involved
in successive municipal and state prosecutions. The court failed to
consider the implications of the due process clause, and its analysis
under the double jeopardy clause revealed a misunderstanding of
the limitations of the precedent upon which it relied.8 2 Moreover,
had the court determined that successive municipal and state prosecutions were unconstitutional, such a decision would have prohibited
only successive municipal and state prosecutions based on exactly
the same evidence.8 3 Thus, it would seem that a rewording of
municipal ordinances and state statutes so that they proscribe somewhat different acts would remove the constitutional objections raised
by the procedure in Ladd and would be of minimal practical consequence. Since such an insignificant adjustment would be required
to avoid the problem raised by Ladd, it would seem but a small
step for a court to declare the procedure in Ladd unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, the court was unwilling to take this step but exercised
itself no further than to reaffirm the erroneous analogy between
84
municipality/state and state/federal relationships.
79 Many of the procedural safeguards, such as trial by jury, which are customarily
available in proceedings in the state courts are not generally available under current
municipal procedure. See 1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW §§ 4A.00.14

(1967).

See note 79 supra.
8"See Grant, Penal Ordinances and the Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy, 25
GEo. L.J. 293 (1937); Comment, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 430 (1963); note 80 supra and
accompanying text.
80 See notes 37-59 supra and accompanying text.
1o

83 See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
84See Gross, supra note 66; notes 39-49 supra and accompanying text.

